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Abstract 
Cancer survival is a profound and complex human life experience. This 
article provides an overview of phenomenology and demonstrates its 
applicability for researching cancer survival. An historical account of 
phenomenology is provided, as well as an overview of key Heideggerian 
concepts. After setting the theoretical context and rationale for the study, 
the article then presents the methods and a brief overview of findings 
from the author’s study of cancer survival. Implications for social work 
are discussed throughout. It is hoped that this article will encourage social 
workers to consider phenomenological approaches to research and 
practice contexts. 
Keywords: Heideggerian phenomenology, cancer, survival, research, 
social work  
Introduction 
 
My purpose in writing this article is to provide an overview of 
Heideggerian phenomenology and how it can be used to understand the 
lived experience of cancer survivorhood. A further purpose is to highlight 
connections for social workers wishing to further understand this 
significant life experience. 
By way of illustration, I present an account of the methods and a 
brief overview of findings from my recent doctoral research exploring the 
lived experience cancer survival (Pascal, 2006). The study was conducted 
in Bendigo, Victoria, Australia, where 15 participants with a range of 
diagnoses of cancer and prognoses volunteered to share their experiences 
during two in-depth interviews, spanning a six-month interval. 
The interviews were audio-taped and then analysed using 
phenomenological interpretation. This interpretation involved a process 
that was informed by phenomenological theory. First, the hermeneutic 
circle process was employed (Ezzy, 2002). That is, data was analysed by 
moving between theory and lived experience, and also between part (lines 
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of transcript) and whole (entire interview or between interview 
transcripts) data sets. Secondly, Heideggerian theory provided a 
perspective for understanding cancer survivorhood and a lens for seeing 
the data. For example, temporality was a key concept to emerge from the 
data and was informed by Heideggerian understandings (Pascal, Endacott 
and Lehmann, 2009). 
Furthermore, it should be noted at the outset that there are many 
“phenomenologies” and that I have chosen an explicitly Heideggerian 
approach. As such, I consider the methodological underpinning to the 
study to be interpretive and hermeneutic, rather than following Husserl’s 
more descriptive and eidetic methods (Hoy, 1999; Guignon, 1999).  For 
the purposes of clarity, it is important to note that I use the term 
“hermeneutic” in relation to Heidegger’s hermeneutic turn, and not in 
allegiance to any particular hermeneutic school of thought (see Schwandt, 
1994, for full discussion). Thus, a Heideggerian, interpretive 
phenomenology was the basis of the study. 
First, I present phenomenology as a theoretical framework for 
undertaking research.  I provide an historical overview, as well as a 
discussion of key Heideggerian concepts. Second, I briefly discuss the 
application of interpretive phenomenology as the ontology and 
epistemology for my research into cancer survival. Third, I outline the 
methods of the study including the aims, data collection and analysis 
process and participant profile, as well as ethical concerns and 
methodological limitations. Finally, I present a brief overview of the 
findings from my research project, focussing on the significance of 
temporality and relationships of care for cancer survivorhood. 
Implications for social work knowledge and practice are discussed 
throughout. 
    
Theoretical Framework 
  
An historical overview of phenomenology 
Historically, phenomenology evolved as an alternative to scientific 
methods traditionally used within the social sciences. Radically for its 
time, phenomenology emphasised the notion of the humanities differing 
from natural sciences and thus requiring differing approaches. These 
differences arise at both the ontological and epistemological levels. 
Ontology is understood here to refer to assumptions concerning the nature 
of being and reality, whilst epistemology refers to assumptions about the 
nature of knowledge (Crotty, 1998). 
Husserl is acknowledged as the founding father of phenomenology, 
although the term had been used earlier by philosophers such as Kant and 
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Hegel (Moran & Mooney, 2002). Husserlian phenomenology sought to 
explore the conscious lived experience of phenomena; particularly ways 
in which phenomena are perceived in everyday life (Moustakas, 1994; 
Crotty, 1998). Husserl was concerned with understanding the 
participant’s life world (lebenswelt) and famously declared the way to 
knowledge was “back to the things themselves” (Holden, 1997), that is, 
back to the experiences of everyday life. 
Importantly, Husserl posited that through bracketing (keeping a 
distance from one’s own subjectivity), it becomes possible to analyse the 
object (for example, an experience, story, or participant) as it appears to 
us as a researcher. A full understanding of phenomena can then be gained. 
In one sense, this was liberation from researchers’ prejudgments. 
However, bracketing raised the spectre of Cartesian mind-body and 
subject-object dualism, thereby favouring the intellect over experience 
(Heidegger, 1996, 2000) and assuming objective researcher knowledge. 
This became a major criticism of Husserl’s thought (Heidegger, 1996, 
2000). 
Additionally, bracketing assumed the researcher can, and should, 
separate knowledge from experience. Martin Heidegger, Husserl’s pupil, 
challenged this assumption. Heidegger claimed that a person, as a Being-
in-the-World, could not be separated from the world. Meaning is co-
developed through our shared humanness and life experiences.  
Heidegger believed it was not possible to bracket experiences, but rather, 
through reflection, we could become aware of our assumptions. Further, 
to bracket our experience we must shed our experience, therefore losing 
our capacity to understand through shared experience and meaning. This 
concept was understood as Heidegger’s ontological difference, and 
formed the basis of his hermeneutic turn    (Cohn, 2002; Heidegger, 1996, 
2001; Guignon, 1999) Thus, Heidegger and Husserl developed differing 
positions regarding phenomenology. Nonetheless, Husserl’s 
phenomenology and mentorship provided the impetus for Heidegger’s 
thought. 
 
The Heideggerian Context  
Heidegger’s analysis of Being (Dasein) is the focus of his seminal work, 
Being and Time (Sein und Zeit).  Heidegger used the word Dasein to 
express the uniqueness of human beings, as opposed to other animal, or 
inanimate, existence. The literal English translation of Dasein is “there 
being”, thus the implication is that we exist as an individual, but also 
within a social context.  Heidegger believed Dasein to be rooted in the 
world as world beings. To separate the person from their experience 
through objectifying their experiences was erroneous (Heidegger, 1996, 
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2000). This inseparability from the world is known as Being-in-the-World 
and is in keeping with the social work concept of person-in-context, and 
systems theories more broadly. That is, Heidegger explicitly stated that 
the world and individuals are indivisible; no world, no being and no being 
no world (Heidegger, 1996, 2000). 
Heidegger claimed Dasein is essentially temporal (Heidegger, 2000; 
Korab-Karowicz, 2001; Watts, 2001). That is, we exist as human beings 
within our own personal and social historical context. Temporality can be 
understood as the past, present and the future and how these shape human 
existence. In everyday life, the past is revealed to us through our moods; 
the present is made manifest through language and meaning; and the 
future is projected as indefinite where we run up against our final horizon; 
death (Watts, 2001). Thus, temporality illustrates being-in-time as 
developmental and historical, as well as highlighting the impermanence 
of our existence. 
Furthermore, Heidegger posited that we are a thrown project 
(Heidegger, 2000; Watts, 2001). Heidegger uses the metaphor of human 
beings akin to clay being thrown upon a potter’s wheel, and that we find it 
difficult to imagine beyond the very randomness of our Being. This 
throwness shapes our entire existence including past, present and future. 
Watts (2001) interprets Heidegger’s meaning as: 
 
So, I can never create myself anew, as I have to work with what I 
have been and what I am now, in order to become what I want to be 
in the future. Consequently there is a continual struggle between the 
drive to actualise my potentials and the influences or restraints of 
my throwness (p. 35). 
 
Beyond Dasein as an individual, Being-in-the-World entails a 
constant relating to the “they” world (das Man). There is controversy 
within the literature as to whether das Man is a necessary set of shared 
community practices, or a constraining force of mass society needing to 
be transcended (Boedeker 2001).  I do not aim to resolve this controversy 
here but rather, I follow Crotty’s (1998) interpretation of das Man as the 
socio-cultural expectations that we all conform to, in some degree, to 
make our lives meaningful and comprehensible. Often, these socio-
cultural expectations remain at a subliminal level of awareness. 
According to Heidegger, this leads to a “they-self”, a self that is 
inauthentic. This inauthenticity makes us prey to falleness; described by 
Heidegger and Watts as absorption with the superficiality of the world 
such as gossip, trivia, mass media, fashion, and consumerism. This serves 
to have a numbing, or tranquilising, effect. Nonetheless, Heidegger (1996, 
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2000) points out that inauthenticity serves a purpose. The inauthenticity 
of the they-world serves as a means of protecting us from our existential 
angst. 
Our inauthenticity is thereby revealed to us through our moods. We 
are always in a type of mood, most often an “everyday” mood that allows 
us to perform our everyday tasks. It is when we experience heightened 
moods, such as deep anxiety, that the nature of our being is called into 
question. This anxiety (not to be confused with anxiety disorders), or 
Angst, can allow us to redefine whom we are in the world, what 
relationships and tasks we will sustain, where we devote our time and 
energy. In short, anxiety can lead to authenticity, to developing 
relationships of care for ourselves, for others and the world (Heidegger, 
1996, 2000). 
Whilst profoundly disturbing, Angst can thus be a way of revealing 
authenticity and can be an enlightening event. Nonetheless, it is intensely 
disturbing as angst reveals the nothingness at the centre of human 
existence. This nothingness centres on the possibility of our own non-
being (Watts, 2001). To see death as a possible mode of existence breaks 
the denial of death and frees Dasein from inauthenticity. To face death 
and its possibility can lead to a richer appreciation of the time and being 
we have in the present.  Death reveals the sobering truth that life and 
death are grounded in time (Watts, 2001). This awareness of the 
inevitability of death is an essential condition of human freedom. 
In summary, Heidegger extended phenomenology to include 
temporality, throwness, falleness, care, authenticity and angst and the 
interpretation of meaning. In common with social work approaches, 
Heidegger’s central concerns were essentially humanistic, locating the 
individual in context of their life-worlds. Heidegger’s work also located 
the social and historical context of individual existence, therefore taking a 
structural, rather than personal, perspective. He emphasised the broader 
influences at hand, avoiding a pathologising stance. Furthermore, 
temporality extends beyond historical contexts, and reminds social 
workers of the developmental unfolding of life, including the finitude of 
death.  Grief, loss can be understood as Angst, but also possibility 
(Heidegger, 1996, 2000). Thus, Heidegger’s work has implications for 
social work by extending the key concepts of structural social work; 
offering a non-pathologising context; highlighting developmental 
contexts and reframing grief and loss. 
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Phenomenology as ontology and epistemology for understanding cancer 
survival 
 
Keeping in mind Heideggerian theory as outlined above, I will now 
discuss the application of phenomenology as a theoretical framework for 
my doctoral research that explored the lived experience of cancer 
survival. Phenomenology provided the ontological and epistemological 
rationale for the research. 
Lived experience of the everyday world, as revealed through 
consciousness, is the primary focus for phenomenological inquiry. Lived 
experience presents to the individual the many truths and realities of life. 
It is through accessing lived experience that researchers may gain 
understanding of the meanings and perceptions of another person’s world. 
This forms the basis of an interpretive, or Heideggerian hermeneutic, 
approach to phenomenology. Steeves noted  
 
A basic premise of the hermeneutic phenomenological method is 
that a driving force of human consciousness is to make sense of 
experience. In general, people try to reach this understanding by 
interpreting their lives as they occur by treating them as narratives 
that are unfolding (p. 59).   
 
Thereby phenomenology was applied both as a research method and a 
philosophy that can illuminate survivorhood. 
As stated above, Heidegger was concerned with the question of 
Being (Frede, 1999; Heidegger, 2000). Similarly, my study was 
concerned with Being a cancer survivor. Following Heideggerian theory, 
I was interested to explore the temporal experience of survival; that is, 
how survivors understood their past, present and future after a cancer 
diagnosis. My study did not concern itself with mental health pathology, 
or normative coping strategies. Rather, I was (and remain) curious about 
the meanings survivors ascribed to this unfolding process. Thus, cancer 
survival was conceptualised as an ontological question of Being. 
As a study of lived experience, I decided not to operationalise the 
concept of “survival”, but rather to understand and include participants’ 
self-definitions. This is an important distinction that I shall explicate here. 
I did not operationalise survivorhood as a measurable variable based on 
medical prognosis, tumour or node status, stage of illness (e.g. 
metastases) or years of survivorhood. Further, empirical research in 
clinical randomised trials  uses various  measures, such as two or five 
years post diagnosis, to delineate survivorhood status.  By contrast, Little 
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et al. (2001) defines survivorhood more subjectively as when the person 
believes they have a reasonable chance of survival. As mine was a study 
of lived experience, and following Little et al.’s more inclusive definition, 
I was interested in the participants’ self-definitions and perceptions. Thus, 
several participants, who self-defined as survivors, revealed poor 
prognosis, metastatic disease and several died subsequent to interview. 
These participants, seemingly not survivors by more traditional 
definitions, nonetheless added a richness and complexity to understanding 
perceptions of survivorhood. Epistemologically, I assumed an inductive, 
theory generating approach, rather than a deductive, theory driven 
approach. Thus, the participants’ own perceptions assisted to generate 
theory. 
Extensive literature reviewing revealed there had been little 
previous research that conceptualised or theorised cancer survival (Little 
et al., 2001; Zebrack, 2000). Although there is a vast body of work 
exploring cancer and illness experience more generally, much of this 
work has explored the patients’ experience (see for example, earlier work 
by Benner, 1994 and Munhall, 1994).  By contrast, I intended to develop 
understanding about the substantive phenomena of survivorhood, not 
illness per se, and to expand the theoretical agenda (Zebrack, 2000). 
Phenomenology, as a theoretical framework, had methodological 
implications for my study. Firstly, the issue of cancer survival is a 
fundamental existential issue. Survivorhood is at once pragmatic, 
presupposing existence, as well as metaphysical in that it calls into 
question the possibilities of both being and non-being. Survival raised 
issues about life and death and the nature of being, thus calling for both 
description and ontological reflection on the nature of being (Heidegger, 
2000). 
The second methodological implication was that of subjectivity, or 
rather the Heideggerian notion of intersubjectivity, as epistemology 
(Inwood, 2000).  Intersubjectivity assumes a co-created and mutual 
research relationship between the researcher and the researched. This 
decreases the object-subject divide within the research relationship and 
acknowledges intersubjective experience, of both parties as a significant 
source of knowledge. Thus, Heidegger’s assertion of an intersubjective 
existence liberated cancer survival from dichotomies such as: mind/body 
connections and disconnections; medical objective knowledge as 
oppositional to subjective lived experience and privileging cognitions 
over feelings or embodied experience. 
Furthermore, Heidegger conceptualised and expressed Being-in-the-
World as a holistic phenomenon (Heidegger, 2000). Being-in-the-World 
can then be understood as the intersubjectivity of interconnectedness and 
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interdependence of human relationships (Cohn, 2002). Translated as a 
research methodology, this includes an exploration of phenomena such as 
temporal, relational, spatial and corporeal life worlds (Munhall, 1994). 
Being-in-the-World encourages research exploration of holistic life 
experiences, including, where appropriate, those of the researchers. 
By way of summary, Heideggerian phenomenology provided an 
ontological and epistemological foundation informing the methodology of 
my study. Key phenomenological concepts included the interpretation of 
lived experience as a means of accessing Being-in-the-World. Such a 
theory sought to acknowledge the embodied, emotional, temporal and 
socio-cultural experiences of participants, thereby was holistic in its 
investigation, in keeping with social work approaches as discussed above. 
 
Overview of the methods of the cancer survival study 
 
What I demonstrate below is how phenomenology informed the methods 
and findings of a cancer survival research project.  This section 
commences with a statement of aims and overview of the methods and 
design of the study.  This is followed by a brief presentation of key 
findings from the study, with a particular focus on temporality and 
relationships of care.  Lastly, a phenomenological interpretation is offered 
and implications for social work knowledge and practice are discussed 
throughout. 
 
The aim 
The aim of my study was to explore the lived experience of cancer 
survival from the perspective of the people who have experienced the 
phenomenon. Lived experience was explored through: 
 
(a) Revealing the phenomenon of cancer survival as it appeared in 
everyday Being-in-the-World, 
(b) Understanding the meanings survivors ascribed to their lived 
experience of the phenomenon of cancer survival. 
The over-arching interview question was; “What is your experience of 
cancer survival since the initial treatment you received?” with further 
exploration of issues such as everyday life, thoughts, feelings, actions, 
meaning-making, awareness of survivorhood status, changes over time, 
uncertainty and death. 
 
Data collection: In-depth Interviews  
Zebrack (2000) claimed that cancer survivors’ accounts enhance the 
understanding of the survival experience. He stated, “Cancer survivors 
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own narratives shed light on cancer’s social impact, and often in a manner 
that illustrates in profound and evocative terms a lived experience of 
cancer” (p240). With this in mind, fifteen self-reported cancer survivors 
were interviewed on two separate occasions over a six-month period, with 
an interval of approximately three-months between the first and second 
interviews. 
The first interviews allowed me to iteratively construct questions for 
further theoretical exploration. The preliminary analyses then informed 
subsequent first and second round interviews. In second round interviews 
I was able to give informal feedback to participants about emerging 
themes, check the direction of my interpretations, and clarify my 
assumptions. In this way, interviews provided access to lived experience 
and allowed survivors to tell and retell, construct and reconstruct their 
thoughts and reflections upon feelings, emotions and temporal 
perceptions of their experiences. Thus, multiple interviews provided a 
stronger basis for creating nuanced understanding; and the emerging 
analysis directed data gathering, self-corrections and analysis, and 
expanded the research process (Charmaz, 2002).   
 
Situating the researcher  
I chose in-depth interviews as a data collection method for their 
methodological accord and because I am a professional social worker 
who is experienced and comfortable with the interview process. As a 
cancer survivor myself, I felt familiar with aspects of participants’ stories 
of lived experience, so my empathy was genuine. Nonetheless, I remained 
cognisant of attending to the confusion and tensions of multiple roles, as 
well as the inherent misunderstandings in any human communication. 
The role of the researcher is not confined only to the interactions 
with participants in the interview context. The role of the researcher 
influences the entire research process; not even in quantitative studies is 
there a neutral observer. The researcher’s background affects the choice 
of question and research design (Moustakas, 1990). 
According to Lowes and Prowse (2001), a defining characteristic of 
Heideggerian phenomenological interviews and research is the 
acknowledgement of the researcher’s beliefs, experiences and 
preconceptions, which are considered a legitimate part of the research 
process. According to Matelrud (2001), the question is neither whether 
the researcher affects the process nor whether such an effect can be 
prevented. A commitment to managing these methodological issues 
demands reflexivity. 
In seeking to define the term “reflexivity”, the literature offered 
contested and multiple interpretations. Given these varying meanings, I 
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concur with Matlerud’s (2001) metaphor of the knower’s mirror. 
Matlerud (2001) described reflexivity as the attitude of attending 
systematically to the context of knowledge construction, especially the 
researcher effect, at every step of the research process. Grbich (1999) 
provided further clarity. She stated reflexivity is: “a process of self 
awareness that should clarify how one’s beliefs have been socially 
constructed and how these values are impacting on interaction and 
interpretation in research settings” (p65). Bias, then, is what is hidden; as 
it cannot be eliminated it can be accounted for (Matlerud 2001). 
As a phenomenological researcher, I translated the epistemological 
concepts of intersubjectivity and reflexivity into research practice beyond 
the interviewer role. Following Moustakas (1990, p16), I engaged in self-
dialogue aiming to acknowledge the “place and unity of intellect, emotion 
and spirit” and my tacit knowledge driving my passionate commitment to 
the topic. This self-dialogue took the shape of a fieldwork journal, memos 
and a reflective diary, as well as personal meditation about phenomena. 
Further, I engaged in dialogue with my supervisors, other postgraduate 
colleagues and oncology social workers, as well as  participants’ 
themselves, regarding my values and assumptions about the research 
process and emerging findings. Moustakas (1990) encapsulates my 
personal research experience as I believe I had a “personal desire to 
know, and a commitment to pursue a question that is strongly connected 
to one’s own identity and selfhood” (p41). 
A reflexive stance is in accord with Heideggerian concepts of both 
intersubjectivity and hermeneutic understanding. Intersubjectivity 
acknowledges values, experience and knowledge the researcher brings to 
the research as not only unavoidable, but with the capacity to enhance the 
research relationship (Benner, 1994; Cohn, 2002; Crotty, 1998). An 
objective bracketing, or a removed epoche is not in accord with 
Heidegger’s stance (Moran & Mooney, 2002; Moustakas, 1994). Rather, 
intersubjectivity creates an interpretive space. This interpretation focuses 
on multiple meanings, what is revealed and concealed and goes beyond 
mere description of phenomena (Watts, 2001). 
 
Ethics 
According to Kellehear (1993), ethical concerns include the principles of 
privacy, informed consent, confidentiality, protection from harm, and 
avoiding deception. These broad principles were adhered to during the 
conduct of the present study. Ethics approval was obtained from the La 
Trobe University Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) prior to the 
commencement of the study, ensuring that what was proposed for this 
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study was within the national statement outlined by National Health and 
Medical Research Council (NHMRC, 1999). 
As the researcher, and because this study was located within 
regional or rural communities, I was particularly concerned about 
confidentiality. To protect participants, names of people and places were 
altered to pseudonyms during transcription and analysis, and all data were 
de-identified: no participant details were stored with transcripts. Thus 
confidentiality applied to the presentation of the data, as well as 
recruitment. All electronic data were stored in password-protected 
computer files and hard copies in the La Trobe University Health 
Sciences Office safe. 
Additionally, with regard to ethical recruitment strategies, I was 
concerned that members from the Cancer Support Group, where I was 
formerly the facilitator, might perceive pressure to participate due to a 
previous personal or professional connection. To avoid this, I requested 
the current facilitator include the flyer in a newsletter and provide 
information sheets when requested. I attended the Cancer Support Group 
only when invited to provide further information and the majority of 
members were unknown to me.  I had direct contact with members only at 
their initiation to request further information or to volunteer. Further, I 
recruited beyond the Cancer Support Group, ensuring a broader 
representation of participants. 
I was also concerned with participants experiencing distress due to 
the personal and sensitive nature of talking about cancer survival. 
Included in the ethics application was a letter of support from a 
Community Health Centre willing to provide counselling and debriefing 
for participants. I also contacted La Trobe University Student Services for 
counselling and debriefing, in the event that I required personal support.  
Ethical concerns go beyond guidelines that are set out by 
committees and national frameworks (Ezzy, 2002; Kellehear, 1993). 
There is a personal and moral obligation on the researcher to treat 
participants with respect for their knowledge, experience and human 
rights. To this extent, phenomenological intersubjectivity enriched the 
ethical research relationship. 
 
Participants 
Fifteen participants, who self-reported a diagnosis of cancer, were 
recruited from support groups and community health centres in the 
Bendigo region. Participants had a range of stages and types of cancer, 
including early stage and palliative experiences, of breast, prostate, 
ovarian, lymphoma, lung and invasive skin cancer. Participants’ 
survivorhood status was self-defined, even if this contradicted medical 
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opinion. This complexity of perceptions was of interest to my study. 
Disease-free survivorhood ranged from 12 months to 15 years post 
diagnosis In keeping with phenomenological methods, the participants 
were recruited using purposive sampling, a non-probability sampling 
technique (Sarantakos, 2001). 
 
Data Analysis and Interpretation 
I chose abductive data analysis for its harmony with the reflexive role of 
the researcher, but also for its dialogic reflexive arc with both the data and 
theory (Ricoeur, 1995).  Put simply, abductive analysis involves testing 
ideas with both deductive logic and inductive empiricism. It is in keeping 
with the phenomenological hermeneutic circle of interpretation (Hoy, 
1999). This circle involves a continuous movement between theory, data 
and experience, whole and part, and assumes phenomena can never be 
absolutely known. 
Following Moustakas (1990), I went through a process of using my 
intuition to develop depth, substance and meaning in the data analysis 
process. This necessitated a period of “indwelling”, or turning inward to 
understand the nature of human experience of cancer survival. I then 
became focused on more deeply exploring the questions, contradictions 
and themes arising from the data. I became immersed in the data 
(Moustakas, 1990). The immersion phase was particularly exhausting, but 
led to illumination of new dimensions of the data. From these 
illuminations came abductive explications. Thus, this process of intuition, 
indwelling, focus, immersion and explication, I formed tentative themes 
that influenced the later coding of the data. 
To assist with the management of the lengthy transcripts, I utilised 
the NVivo data analysis package (QSR International, 2000). I was 
initially hesitant about using computer software for analysis, imagining it 
to be linear, positivist and objectifying the data (Ezzy, 2002). I also feared 
it might distance me from the data (Dickson-Swift, 2004) and be in 
contradiction to my phenomenological aims. Such fears were unfounded 
when I realised that NVivo is a data management tool (albeit 
sophisticated), I remained responsible for the analysis process as NVivo 
manages but does not conceptualise data, so I used it to enhance my own 
phenomenological analytic style. 
Moustakas (1990) process of intuition, indwelling, focus, 
immersion, illumination and explication is not fey, but rather, calls for 
emotional courage. The process of immersion in data of cancer survival 
was at times painful and distressing. Many times I had to stop due to 
sadness, anger or awe at the participants’ stories. Although painful at the 
time, I now believe my emotional response enhanced my thinking and 
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reasoning about the analysis (Campbell, 2002). Thus, data and theory, as 
well as my intuitive processes informed the codes for the findings 
interpretations. The process of writing and rewriting the findings further 
assisted my understandings (Cohen et al., 2000). 
 
Methodological Limitations 
There are challenges in every methodological tradition (Creswell, 1998). 
Within the present study there were limitations with sampling. Firstly, 
using a purposive technique I was seeking “information rich” participants 
and, initially, recruited from Support Groups and Health Centres. It is 
possible that participants were already in a supportive network, thus felt 
more confident with discussing personal and social experiences. Locating 
participants who experience social isolation posed recruitment challenges 
of access and equity to participate. 
Additionally, there were limitations in participant demography.  
Although not seeking representativeness, I was intending a balanced 
sample. There was a balance of age groups, treatment regimes and 
diagnoses (given Australian national survival rates). Nonetheless, of the 
15 participants, 11 were women. Thus, there was an imbalance of gender, 
perhaps reflecting service user trends. Further, there was only one 
participant beyond 10 years of survival. It is possible that the recency of 
the experience motivated participation. Additionally, poorer prognosis for 
some diagnostic groups may have precluded participation for longer-term 
survivors. Further, not seeking generalisability, the sample size was small, 
limited to a particular geographic context (Bendigo region of Victoria), 
largely Anglo-Saxon or European in cultural heritage. However, a larger 
and more diverse study may have uncovered a greater breadth or depth of 
experiences of survivorhood. 
There were also limitations in the role of the researcher. As a PhD 
candidate, I was not working in a research team and was subject to the 
pitfalls of the lone analyst (Patton, 1999). I maintained a reflexive and 
ethical commitment to the data collection and representation; nonetheless, 
no interpretation is value free and a commitment to rigour and 
trustworthiness may be insufficient to eradicate bias. Further, a 
commitment to intersubjectivity and co-creation of research knowledge, 
does not eradicate power imbalances between the researcher and the 
researched, however ‘emic’ my experience as a survivor might be. That 
is, as a researcher from a university, and the author of this PhD thesis, 
there was power in my professional role. 
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Findings and Interpretation 
 
The Lived Experience of Cancer Survival 
My study found cancer survival to be a complex personal, social and 
meaning- making phenomenon that persisted beyond the acute stages of 
medical treatment. Changes to body, state of mind, temporal 
understanding and spiritual meaning were manifest in everyday Being-in 
the-World. As such, survival can be understood as pervasive throughout 
all aspects of lived experience. The table below presents a brief overview 
of the key themes and findings from my doctoral research.  
 
Table 5 
Overview of the Key Findings 
Physical Attunement Temporality Spirituality 
everyday 
body 
 
treatment 
body 
 
sexual body 
emotional roller 
coaster 
 
feeling Fear 
 
thinking positive 
 
uncertainty 
 
The Past 
- das Man 
- previous 
experience 
- family-of-origin 
 
The Present 
- the call 
- care for self and 
others 
 
The Future 
- dreams and 
hopes 
- anniversaries 
- being for death 
- compassion 
- authenticity and 
care 
Why me? 
 
solace in 
communion 
 
benevolence 
 
religious 
spirituality 
 
 
 
It is beyond the scope of this article to address each section in-depth; 
nonetheless, what is presented below are selected brief excerpts from the 
original findings demonstrating these everyday changes, with a particular 
focus upon temporality and relationships of care. Pseudonyms, rather than 
numbers, have been used to give a human voice to the participants’ 
words, and at the same time preserving their confidentiality. 
A highly significant finding in my study was that temporality and 
relationships of care were intimately entwined as sites of meaning-making 
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and self-identity. These findings are expanded upon in Pascal, Endacott 
and Lehmann (2009). To summarise here, the re-evaluations of the world 
before cancer and the influence of previous adverse life experiences were 
especially important. Overwhelmingly, my study found that family of 
origin experiences were of major importance. Family of origin 
experiences were reflected upon as an historical connection with one’s 
past relational self, a site of potential resolution for painful relationships, 
and an historic, genetic and familial site for the experience of living or 
dying from cancer. Agnes explained 
 
I lost family members you know; my father, step-father, grandfather, 
a sister. For me just knowing that I could have died and I didn’t. 
 
In turning to the present context of temporal experience, my study 
found cancer survival to be described as a wake-up call, leading to 
changes in the nature of relationships of care for self and others. As Frank 
said: 
 
My outlook has been that what I was doing before couldn’t have 
been that beneficial to my health. It gave me a big wake-up.  
 
Again, family relationships were important for cancer survivors, both as 
temporal and relational sites of meaning-making. These relationships 
included partners, dependent and adult children and grandchildren.  
Miriam described her husband’s shock-like response:  
 
I don’t think it had really sunk in. I think my husband was with me 
and he was more upset than I was. I think he thought it was the end 
of the world. 
 
Nonetheless, after the shock there is a heightened awareness of, and 
appreciation for, the tenuous nature of human existence; including 
vicarious insights for family members as well the survivor themselves. 
Joy said:  
 
It’s made them more aware that everyone is vulnerable. And that’s 
made me feel that way too. Nobody knows what is going to happen 
tomorrow and your life can be changed just in the blink of an eye. 
You just have to make the most of what you have got.  
 
Dreams, hopes, anniversaries and anticipated personal milestones 
were part of the imagined future temporality of cancer survival. Here too, 
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family relationships, especially those with children, were significant as 
temporal connections with a past, present and future self in relationships 
of care. Frank explained:  
 
The main resolve that I was going to see my daughter’s 21st 
Birthday party. No matter what I did, that was the thing that kept me 
going. She was three months when I got diagnosed. I am going to 
see you at your 21st. That’s a long-term goal.  
 
The survival experience within the social and relational context was 
not unproblematic. As well as love and support, relationships facilitated 
feeling not at home with one’s relational self as personal and social roles 
and expectations changed in unspoken ways. These changes, at times, led 
to rethinking relationship and perhaps disconnection or abandonment, 
particularly in the transition of early survivorhood. Darcy recalled:  
 
I found that some of your friends couldn’t talk about it.  They would 
skirt around it or not even mention it and they would drift off a bit 
as if you had the plague. 
 
Temporality and relationships of care were significant and entwined 
aspects of survivorhood. A further key finding was that, beyond the self 
and immediate family and social context, cancer survival entailed seeking 
a future of compassionate and ethical community relationships, including 
spiritual and religious communities. 
Further, this revelation of the importance of care created a reflective 
space for questions about personal and social ethics, and what it is to lead 
a “good life”. This metaphysical question about a good life was not 
answered in terms of the acquisitive Western social and personal 
constructions of positivity, problem solving, work, income, or 
consumerism. Kaylah provided further insight. She explained 
 
People think that happiness is this thing that comes in the future 
when they have paid the mortgage off and they have got this BMW 
in the driveway and this fabulous job and 2.5 children in their 
designer clothes and it’s not. People get there and they are not 
happy.  
 
Relationships of care, including spiritual communion, were seen as 
providing meaning that replaced previous socio-cultural norms. There 
was a revisioning of life that encompassed changed attitudinal and 
behavioural dimensions. Thereby, from a Heideggerian perspective 
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cancer survival could be understood to be a temporal authenticity of care. 
Some examples of this included Grace described not wanting to be caught 
in the das Man of the working world:  
 
From a work perspective I don’t take it quite as seriously. I’m not 
very ambitious anymore. You know I enjoy it, and I’m very lucky 
that I enjoy my job, but I certainly don’t want to go any higher. 
Life’s too short for that stuff. 
 
Kate explained she had become 
 
a more kinder, compassionate person. I hope that as you get older 
you let go of all your insecurities and that’s what I’m looking 
forward to just going ‘stuff it’ this is the way I am. 
 
Robert decided to become an organ donor. He explained:  
 
On my licence now, I’ve donated every part of my body to whatever 
they want within a reasonable period, then I want to be cremated. 
 
Frank made the change to live in a rural community, returning to a 
childhood dream:  
 
So it will be pleasurable sources there, like selling chook eggs or 
food from the vege garden, supplementing our need to buy veges. 
We’ll just grow them ourselves and that’s something that I find 
really healthy and enjoyable. So it’s just a way of changing it 
around. 
 
As stated previously, these changes were not unproblematic and created 
feelings of both meaning and meaninglessness. Frank expressed his 
confusion at what might come next in the survivorhood experience. He 
wondered:  
 
OK, I’ve got through that first stage, now what the hell am I going 
to do?  It was a bit like,’ well, what do I do next?’ I’ve actually 
found it quite upsetting or distressing. I’ve gone through depression 
about it.   
 
These feelings of Angst bear similarity to uncertainty, distress and 
liminality (Breaden, 1997; Holland, 2002; Little, Jordens, Paul and 
Sayers., 2001; Nelson, 1996), rather than diagnostic mental illness. 
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However, when understood from a Heideggerian perspective, these 
feelings of Angst were welcomed as a space for understanding Being-in-
the-World. As Ruth explained: 
 
I think the death experience actually makes you feel more alive, it 
makes you think, ‘right, life’s absolutely bloody amazing!’ … How 
much beauty there is out there, how much experience there is yet to 
have. I feel like there is actually not enough time. Even if I’m going 
to be well until I’m 80, there still isn’t enough time. 
 
I do not wish to imply that cancer does not precipitate mental illness or 
acute emotional anguish: the literature indicates approximately 30% of 
those diagnosed with cancer may also be diagnosed with anxiety, 
depression or PTSD. However, even for 30% with a mental health 
diagnosis, Angst may predominate. Further, such estimates do not fully 
inform us about, or adequately explain, the cancer survival experience. 
Thus, Heideggerian Angst is a powerful re-interpretation of diagnostic 
anxiety as a space for understanding temporal authenticity of care. 
 
A Heideggerian Interpretation of Cancer Survival: Relationships of Care 
and Authenticity 
 
The Heideggerian notion of “care” is not restricted to the description of 
“caring for”. That is, care does not only denote looking after another 
person by tending to their need for food, clothing, companionship or 
medicine. Nor is care worry, willing or wishing on behalf of another 
entity (Heidegger, 2000). Rather, care is what has significance for us as 
human beings: care for our own existence (Watts, 2001).  According to 
Leonard (1994), “we exist existentially because of the things we care 
about, the for-the-sake-of-which… we exist in terms of what matters to 
us” (p. 54). 
There is an essential connection between Being-for-death and care, 
as Dasein is always concerned about its own Being. From a Heideggerian 
perspective, the Angst of uncertainty of survival can be understood as 
caring about one’s mortality, as one’s individuality is disclosed in the 
Angst of Being-for-death (Heidegger, 2000). 
The Heideggerian structure of care can further be understood 
ontologically as care for self (Selbstsorge), care for others (Fursorge), 
and care for projects or things (Besorge) (Inwood, 2000). Firstly, the 
findings demonstrate participants’ care for themselves. Participants 
undertook medical and self-treatment, managed their physical and 
emotional health, underwent changes to attitudes and values, and re-
Pascal   
© Currents: New Scholarship in the Human Services 
Volume 9, Number 2, 2010 
	  
19 
prioritised working and family relationships. The meaning of this 
uncertainty can be understood as Unheimlichkeit (literally translated as 
not-at-home or unfamiliar) and Angst, which served to reveal Dasein’s 
fundamental aspect of care for its own being (Heidegger, 2000). Beyond 
self-care, Dasein can be viewed as relational and caring for others. 
Overwhelmingly, participants described the significance of caring 
relationships as making meaning of personal identity, role and temporal 
connections. Family of origin, partners, children, adult children, 
friendships, support groups, and informal care relationships all 
contributed to survivors Being-in-the-World as care. 
These relationships were not only about survivors receiving support 
from family and friends, but also revealed the significance of those 
relationships as a means of survivors giving support to others, thereby 
enhancing self-identity and finding meaning. These relationships, at 
times, were challenging, painful and did not always survive the survival 
experience. Whilst most participants experienced caring for others as a 
shared journey, several participants experienced distance from, or even 
abandonment by family or friends. The lack of relationships of care, in 
these instances, further highlighted the ontological and temporal 
significance of reciprocal relationships of care. 
Having a passionate commitment to a project beyond one’s self and 
family was important for survivors. It was demonstrated that the wake-up 
call of cancer was a call to conscience to lead a good life (Heidegger, 
2000; Morton, 1996). This conscience awareness revealed metaphysical 
and ethical questions for survivors. Through a redefining of relationships, 
survivors found they wished to transcend the acquisitive demands of das 
Man and return to a more compassionate Being-in-the-World. Most 
participants wished to make a contribution to their communities. 
Pragmatically, this was demonstrated in volunteer work, cancer support 
group attendance, organ donation, animal aid and more time spent with 
family and friends. Furthermore, Besorge (caring for projects) gave a 
sense of purpose to the cancer experience, with participants using their 
experience of suffering to assist the wider community. This pedagogy of 
suffering (Frank, 1995) was translated into pedagogy of survival. Cancer 
had taught survivors fundamental lessons about care as a connecting and 
unifying temporal experience for Dasein. 
 
Conclusions 
 
This study pointed to the temporal significance of relationships of care as 
a site of meaning-making throughout cancer survival. Within this 
historical and relational context, Angst facilitated a reflective space for 
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gaining understanding of this complex personal, social and ethical life 
experience. 
Cancer survival is not an illness and requires its own analytic 
frameworks. Using Heideggerian phenomenology, my study has extended 
normative and developmental problem solving approaches to illness, and 
their implications for survival experiences.  Through understanding lived 
experience, Heideggerian phenomenology critiques, as well as contributes 
to, the inchoate survival discourses. Survival can be interpreted, not as a 
linear journey, an emplotted narrative, or a disease trajectory, but rather 
as a hermeneutic space for understanding temporal authenticity of care 
(see figure 1). Such an interpretation contributes to extending existing 
social work, medical and therapeutic contexts. 
 
Figure 1 
The Ontological Structure of Cancer Survival 
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